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Abstract 
 
The proliferation of global value chains (GVCs) is portrayed in academic and policy 
circles as representing new development opportunities for firms and regions in 
the global south. This article tests these claims by examining original material 
from non-governmental organizations’ reports and secondary sources on the 
garment and electronics chains in Cambodia and China respectively. This 
empirical evidence suggests that these GVCs generate new forms of worker 
poverty. Based on these findings the article proposes the new Global Poverty 
Chain (GP) approach. The study critiques and reformulates principal concepts 
associated with the GVC approach –of value-added, rent and chain governance - 
and challenges a core assumption prevalent within GVC analysis: that workers’ 
low wages are a function of their employment in low productivity sectors. Instead 
it shows that 1) many supplier firms in the global south are as, or more, 
productive than their equivalent’s in the global north; 2) that (often 
predominantly female) workers in these industries are super exploited (paid 
wages below their subsistence requirements); and that 3) chain governance 
represents a lead firm value-capturing strategy, which intensifies worker 
exploitation. 
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“Theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (Robert Cox, 1981). 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The world’s total labour force has grown from approximately 2.3 billion in 1990 
to 3.4 billion in 2017 (World Bank: 2017).2 More dramatically, the number of 
workers in exporting industries across the globe quadrupled between 1980 and 
2003, and continues to expand (IMF 2007: 162). Recent years have seen 
increased interested about whether workers benefit from employment in 
exporting industries. Much of this research has been carried out within the Global 
Value Chain (GVC) academic and policy communities (Barrientos, Gereffi and 
Rossi: 2011, Brewer: 2011, Coe and Hess: 2013, Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen: 
2014, Smith et al.: 2014, Egels-Zandén and Lindholm:  2015, Bair and Palpacuer: 
2015, Ruwanpura: 2016, Mosley: 2017). 3  In general, within the GVC policy 
community, the above question has been answered in the affirmative, and has 
often been framed in win-win terms. For example, OECD Secretary General Angel 
Gurr’ıa argues that ‘[e]veryone can benefit from global value chains . . . [and that] 
‘encouraging the development of and participation in global value chains is the 
road to more jobs and sustainable growth for our economies’ (2013)4 (see also 
ILO: 2013, OECD\WTO\World Bank: 2014, World Bank: 2017). Similarly, the 
primary position within academic GVC analysis is that ‘development requires 
linking up with the most significant lead firm in the industry’ (Gereffi: 2001, 1622). 
While prevalent, these views are not absolute. UNCTAD’s 2017 Trade and 
                                                          
2 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.TOTL.IN 
3 The GVC concept denotes ‘the full range of activities that are required to bring a product from its conception, 
through its design, its sourced raw materials and intermediate inputs, its marketing, its distribution and its 
support to the final consumer’ (See  https://globalvaluechains.org/concept-tools). In this article, and for the 
sake of simplicity I use the term GVC as an umbrella term referring also to the Global Commodity Chain (GCC) 
and Global Production Network (GPN) approaches (but see Campling and Selwyn: 2018, for a nuanced 
discussion of, and distinction between, these frameworks).  
4 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/newapproachtoglobalisationandglobalvaluechainsneededtoboostgrowthandjobs.
htm [accessed September, 2018).  
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Development Report characterises increasing concentration of power within 
GVCs as representing the creation of ‘a new form of global rentier capitalism to 
the detriment of balanced and inclusive growth for the many’, where ‘the winner 
take most’  (UNCTAD: 2017, 119, 125). 
This article tests the claims that workers benefit from employment in GVCs 
by examining original material from non-governmental organizations’ reports 
and secondary sources on the garment and electronics chains in Cambodia and 
China respectively. This empirical evidence suggests that, contrary to optimistic 
claims, these GVCs generate new forms of worker poverty. Based on these 
findings the article suggests that such chains should be renamed and re-theorised 
as Global Poverty Chains (GPCs).   
The empirical findings and theoretical reformulations are significant for 
development theory and policy in two ways. They suggest the need to re-think 
the purported benefits of global integration, and to place greater emphasis on 
collective actions by labouring classes and pro-labour policies by states to better 
workers’ conditions in such industries.  
 Following this introduction the remainder of this article is organised into 
the following sections. Section 2 discusses recent GVC literature addressing the 
labour question and argues that poverty analysis rooted in a concept of dignified 
work and a living wage facilitates investigation into costs and benefits to workers 
of employment in export industries.  Section 3, drawing upon Robert Cox (1981), 
distinguishes between problem-solving and critical GVC analysis in order to 
highlight how keys concepts in the problem-solving GVC framework – of value-
added, rent, and governance – lend themselves to positive interpretations of the 
impacts of global integration upon labour. This critique provides the basis for the 
article’s alternative theorisation of GVCs as GPCs. Section 4 provides an account 
of the capital-labour dialectics of the global business revolution, and challenges 
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dominant assumptions about the direct relationship between productivity and 
wages. Section 5 draws extensively upon Non-Governmental Organisations’ and 
secondary literature sources to highlight workers’ poverty pay and conditions in 
Cambodian garment and Chinese electronics chains respectively. Section 6 
summarises the article’s findings and concludes with suggestions for further 
research. 
 
2 GVC Analysis, Poverty Analysis and Labour 
The question of whether workers benefit from employment in globalised 
industries is an open one. In part the answer depends on the metric employed 
and methodology of such analysis (see below). Relatively early GVC-based studies 
found that workers in supplier firms earned higher wages than those for workers 
in non-traded sectors (for an overview see Nadvi: 2004). A recent cross-sectoral 
study of apparel, wood furniture, automotive, and mobile phone GVCs found, 
however, that economic and social upgrading [improved firm level 
competitiveness and better working conditions, respectively] has occurred in just 
over a quarter of cases analysed (Bernhardt and Pollack: 2016).  
 As will be argued below, much GVC analysis has a limited conception of the 
constitutive role of labour, changing class relations in the formation and 
functioning of GVCs, and ways in which employment in GVCs can generate new 
forms of worker poverty.  This article argues that the proliferation of GVCs has 
been based upon a) the prior establishment of large, poor (and thus cheap) 
labour forces (through processes such as rural displacement and industrial 
restructuring) and that b) their subsequent incorporation into GVCs generates 
new forms of labouring class poverty.  
While much GVC analysis explains workers’ poverty wages as a 
consequence of their employment in low productivity industries this article 
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shows the contrary to be the case.  Workers’ poverty is a consequence of 
employers’ ability to pay them very low wages and to subject them to harsh 
working and living conditions as part of their capital accumulation strategies.  
This article begins from the Marxian precept that labour exploitation is a 
core dimension of capitalism: Workers are systematically paid less than the value 
they produce for their employers. Under certain circumstances, this unequal and 
exploitative relationship can generate various forms of worker poverty. Such 
poverty entails both very low wages and bodily degradation (for the analytical 
significance of poverty as physical degradation see Mezzadri: 2017). As Marx 
warned, ‘Capital…takes no account of the health and the length of life of the 
worker, unless society forces it to do so’ (Marx: 1990, 381, emphasis added).5  
The causal relationship between employment and worker poverty is 
explained here through the application of the concept of super-exploitation, 
which specifies how workers are remunerated below their social reproduction 
costs (Marini: 1973, and below). The notion of social reproduction costs implies 
a ‘moral element’ in the definition and calculation of poverty (Marx: 1990, 275). 
These costs are determined in part by socially accepted or enforced norms 
governing workers’ living and working conditions.   
 Whilst in its earlier days (from the mid1990s to the early 2000s) GVC 
analysis shied away from theorising labour’s constitutive role in the formation 
and reproduction of such chains, over the last decade or so there has been a 
veritable flourishing of such research, much of it from a critical theoretical 
perspective. Newsome, Taylor, Bair and Rainnie’s (2015) edited collection places 
                                                          
5 This article complements other analyses of the relations between contemporary globalisation and dynamics 
of labour impoverishment,  including on family farming in Sub-Saharan Africa (Rigg: 2006), the working poor in 
Western Europe (Pradella: 2015) ,the proliferation of child, family and working poverty in the UK (Armstrong: 
2017), new forms of coerced labour (McGrath: 2013, Le Baron: 2015), the globalisation of informal and 
‘flexible’ labour (Bernards: 2018), and the ranks of ‘circulating’ labour across South Asia (Pattenden: 2016).  
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the labour process, dynamics of class formation and representation at the centre 
of critical GVC analysis. Jennifer Bair and Marion Werner (2011) theorise the 
broader societal conditions – including peasant dispossession and the 
reproduction of a reserve army of labour -  which facilitate and enable the 
formation and functioning of GVCs. Nicola Phillips (2011) shows how 
combinations of contractual/legal labour formality and informality underpin 
dynamics of ‘adverse incorporation’ (poverty generation) within GVCs. Feminist 
(inspired) analysis illuminates how ‘women workers effectively provide a subsidy 
to production under supply chains and pay the price of government strategies 
that rely on precarious jobs’ (Kidder and Raworth: 2004, 13, See also  Jenkins: 
2013, Dunaway: 2014,  Mezzadri: 2016). The Monthly Review journal has 
published several interventions which illuminate links between super-
exploitation of labour and lead firm accumulation strategies (Foster: 2015, 
Suwandi: 2015, Smith: 2016, and see below). Recent critical research deploys 
aspects of the GVC approach to trace how dynamics of production outsourcing 
impact upon labour in garments (Mezzadri: 2016, Carswell and De Neve: 2013, 
Ruwanpura and Hughes: 2016, Prentice et al.,2017, Anner: 2015), and electronics 
(Chan: 2013, Pun: 2015, and Selden and Wu: 2011). This article adds to this 
literature by specifying how distinct forms of capitalist exploitation underpin 
particular types of worker poverty.  
One of the difficulties, however, of assessing the developmental potentials 
and pitfalls for labour associated with GVC inclusion is that the dominant 
conception of poverty across development studies and GVC communities is the 
World Bank’s ‘dollar-a-day’ approach. This conception enables, and arguably 
encourages, positive interpretations of the relationship between globalisation 
and the prevalence of poverty.  For example, Director of the UN sustainable 
development solutions network Jeffrey Sachs argues that ‘sweatshops are the 
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first rung on the ladder out of extreme poverty’ (Sachs 2005, 11). However, Sachs’ 
argument holds only because workers in (most) sweatshops earn enough so that 
they consume above the World Bank-designed International Poverty Line (IPL) 
($1.90 PPP 2015). The Bank’s IPL is arbitrary, in that it does not actually calculate 
workers’ survival needs.  If it were to do so, it would reveal that many groups of 
workers in global value chains are experiencing new forms of poverty (see Reddy 
and Pogge: 2002, Sumner: 2016, Selwyn: 2017).  In contrast to arbitrary 
conceptions of poverty, Bolwig et al; (2010, 179) argue that ‘poverty itself is a 
political and moral, not an analytical, term’ and ‘assessments of the ‘poverty’ 
impact of value-chain restructuring and governance should be alive to the whole 
range of meanings and concerns that animate both policy jargon and popular 
discourse about poverty.’  
 In this vein, the following analysis deploys the Clean Clothes Campaign 
(CCC) and Asian Floor Wage (AFW) approach to poverty wages vs living wages. 
This concept of a living wage derives, initially, from the United Nations’ 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), article 23 on the right to work, which holds 
that a worker is entitled to the right to ‘just and favourable remuneration 
ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity’. 6 
According to the CCC\AFW, a living wage: 
  
should be earned in a standard working week (no more than 48 hours) and 
allow a…  worker to be able to buy food for herself and her family, pay the 
rent, pay for healthcare, clothing, transportation and education and have 
a small amount of savings for when something unexpected happens. ( 
https://cleanclothes.org/livingwage/calculating-a-living-wage). 
 
                                                          
6 http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ 
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According to CCC\AFW’s conception of a living wage, an adult worker requires 
3,000 calories a day to be able to carry out their work and ‘needs to be able to 
support themselves and two other ‘consumption units’ [1 Consumption unit = 1 
adult or 2 children] (ibid).  
If this conception of a living wage is set as a developmental base-line, and 
deployed as a methodology to investigate the relationship between employment 
in globalised industries and worker poverty, then much of what is labelled as 
development needs to be re-thought. When workers in GVCs do not earn living 
wages, this article argues that such GVCs should be renamed as Global Poverty 
Chains (GPCs).  
 
3 PROBLEM-SOLVING vs CRITICAL GVC ANALYSIS  
This section outlines key concepts associated with problem-solving GVC analysis. 
It then reconstructs them, from an historical materialist perspective, for 
deployment as a critical GVC/ Global Poverty Chain approach.  Table 1 and Figure 
1 provide short-hand visualisations of what is at stake, theoretically and 
politically, in this de\re-construction. 
GVC analysis’ can be traced back as far back as the critical World Systems 
Theory’s (WST) Commodity Chain (CC) approach, popularised during the 1970s. 
According to WST, the core – semi-periphery – periphery structure of the world 
system was reproduced through unequal exchange between peripheral towards 
core regions. Arguably, the transformation of the chain concept’s orientation - 
from critical to problem-solving theory - began with Gereffi, Korzeniewicz and 
Korzeniewicz’s (1994) and  Gereffi ‘s (1994) formulation of the Global Commodity 
Chain (GCC). Unlike CC’s concern with dynamics of unequal exchange over the 
longue durèe, GCC analysis was orientated towards detailing contemporary 
influences of TNC-led global restructuring upon developmental processes in the 
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global south. The constitutive categories of the new approach were governance 
structure, territoriality, input-output structure, institutional environment, and 
the distinction between buyer-driven and producer-driven commodity chains 
(Gereffi et al., 1994, Gereffi: 1994, Gereffi: 1995). Notably, in the GCC approach 
production is theorised as an input-output structure (where raw materials are 
transformed into final products), rather than as an exploitative social sphere.  
In their portrayal of forces driving the proliferation of GCCs, Gereffi et al 
(1994) drew upon Michael Porter’s (1990)  distinction between ‘lower’ and 
‘higher’ order competitive advantages, derived from neoclassical notions of 
lower and higher value added economic activities. Cheap labour is an example of 
the former, while product differentiation, brand reputation, industrial upgrading 
and customer relations are examples of the latter. Neither Porter nor Gereffi et 
al observed, nor sought to theorise, the co-dependent\co-productive 
relationship, through GCCs, of these different forms of competitive advantage 
(or, how one form relies and\or depends upon the other). This analytical and 
theoretical distinction would be very important for subsequent analyses of lead 
firm governance and simplified conceptions of supplier firm upgrading 
strategies.7   
Since the mid 1990’s the GCC has morphed into the GVC approach. The 
latter is much more explicitly policy orientated than the former, aiming to identify 
where higher value-adding activities occurs in these chains, and to facilitate 
                                                          
7 Much literature on supplier firm upgrading is beset by (at least) a triple fallacy. The fallacy of composition 
(where what works for one firm as an upgrading strategy is held to work for all firms); of comparison (if one 
firm can upgrade, so can all firms) (Selwyn: 2015, 256), and of distribution (where the ‘social upgrading’ of 
some workers’ conditions is understood to be generalizable to all workers, rather than as often occurs, at the 
expense of other workers (Bair and Werner: 2015). For example, the high-tech revolution that has yielded the 
Iphone rests upon the proliferation of manufacturing assembly production by workers in companies such as 
Foxconn, and upon the mining of metals such as cobalt, aluminium and copper, often under condition of 
forced labour, in mines across the global south. The majority of GVC analysis, when discussing the conditions 
and remuneration of workers in these nodes of the chain do not enquire into the systemic chain dynamics that 
simultaneously create good jobs in the global north and bad jobs in the global south.  
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upgrading  towards  them (Gereffi et al, 2001).  The GVC approach has been taken 
up by states, international institutions, and agencies as a developmental tool-box 
(see Werner et al, 2014).  As alluded to in figure 1 and table 1, this shift is of 
foundational importance to conceptualising dynamics of, and allocating rewards 
from, economic growth.   
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Table 1: Contested Concepts in GVC Analysis: Some Markers 
Issue of GVC 
Analysis 
(Problem-Solving) GVC Analysis (Critical) Global Poverty Chain Analysis 
Key Concept Theoretical 
Roots 
Developmental 
Implications for 
supplier firms 
Key 
Concept 
Theoretical 
Roots 
Developmental 
Implications  for 
supplier firm  
workers 
Value Value-added Porterian 
business 
strategy and 
neoclassical 
economics 
Raise in-firm 
value added 
Surplus 
Value 
Marx on 
sources of 
capitalist 
profit 
Workers’ labour is the 
source of value 
Distribution of 
Value 
Rent Ricardo and 
Schumpeter 
Innovate to 
insulate from 
competition 
Distribut
ion of 
Surplus 
Value 
Marx on the 
process of 
capital 
accumulation  
Fruits of labour 
extracted by 
employers and 
captured by other 
firms in the chain 
Chain 
Coordination 
Governance Trans-action 
cost 
economics  
(Williamson) 
Link-up to TNCs 
to gain efficient 
market access 
Control, 
Profit-
Maximis
ation, 
value 
capture 
Hymer’s 
Theory of 
Trans-
national firm 
Labour control and 
exploitation 
undertaken by local 
employers, and 
remote firms.  
 
The neoclassical\Porterian notion of value-added is conceived as the difference 
between prices paid for inputs and prices received for outputs. Value-added is 
held to occur solely within firms, and value ‘cannot leak to other firms or be 
captured from them’ (Smith: 2012: 6. See, e.g.  Taglioni and Winkler: 2016). In 
GVC analysis notions of value-added are supplemented by Schumpeterian 
conceptions of innovation and rent (where the latter refers to economic returns 
from possession of\access to scarce resources). Raphael Kaplinsky (2004) shows 
how such innovations are designed to raise entry-barriers (increase the costs) to 
other firms to participate in activities from whence lead firms generate high rates 
of value-added and derive their greatest profitability (portrayed in the smile-
curve in figure 1).   
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Figure 1: Neoclassical vs Marxist Conceptions of Value Formation and Capture in Global Value 
Chains 
 
Source: Lauesen and Cope (2015). (c) monthly review, vol 67 no 3, july-august 2015, used by permission. 
 
According to the above schema, workers’ low wages are a function of their 
employment in industries with low entry barriers, and thus subject to intense cost 
competition (e.g. Kaplinsky: 2004). Such industries are characterised by low 
productivity and limited scope for value-added. Better wages for workers result 
from raising firm-level productivity, competitiveness and value-added (e.g. World 
Bank: 2017). Such arguments, however, cannot explain why workers employed 
in supplier firms within GVCs in the global south are often more productive than 
workers doing the same jobs in the global north, whilst earning only a fraction of 
the wage (and see section 4.3. below).  
 Marx’s labour theory of value (including his understanding of surplus value 
distribution) and later applications of it, provides an alternative starting point 
from which to investigate relations between firms, between capital and labour, 
and dimensions of worker exploitation and impoverishment under capitalism.  
The ‘inner secret’, as Marx (1990) put it, of capitalist profit is capital’s 
ability to reap a greater portion of value from workers’ labour power (surplus 
value) than the cost of its initial purchase. Firms can increase the surplus value 
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appropriated from workers through increasing rates of a) relative surplus value 
extraction (intensification of the working day); b) absolute surplus value 
extraction (lengthening the working day); c) immiseration (by pushing down 
wages); or d) super-exploitation (paying wages that do not satisfy workers’ 
subsistence requirements), and\or combinations of a-d). 
Capitalist exploitation is not only an ‘economic’ matter (of surplus value 
extraction) but entails the degradation of labour: ‘[I]n…. its insatiable appetite for 
surplus labour, capital oversteps not only the moral but even the merely physical 
limits of the working day. It usurps [workers’] time for growth, development and 
healthy maintenance of the body.’ (Marx: 1990, 375-6, and for a contemporary 
theorisation, Mezzadri: 2016).  
Whether firms pursue one, another, or a combination of surplus value 
extraction strategies, and the extent of the associated labour degradation is an 
empirical and conjunctural question. For example, Selwyn, Musiolek and Ijarja 
(2018) show how the Eastern and Central European footwear sector has 
experienced long term wage repression (immiseration) and the dismantling of 
welfare provision, generating a situation where workers are now super-exploited.  
In other cases, working classes may be formed (for example, through rural 
dispossession and urbanisation) and subject to dynamics of super-exploitation in 
recently established economic sectors (Delgado-Wise and Veltmeyer: 2016).  
The concept of super-exploitation lies in the background of Marx’s Capital,  
As the primary objective there is to uncover and explain the general form of 
capitalist exploitation.8 (In order to posit his theory of surplus value production 
and extraction, he assumes that labour power is paid for by capitalists according 
to its value, or costs of production). It was, however, taken up and applied by 
                                                          
8 But see Capital Vol 3, chapter 14, section 2 which is entitled ‘Depression Of Wages Below The Value Of 
Labour-Power’ (Marx: 1974).  
14 
 
Marxist dependency theorists, in particular by Ruy Mauro Marini to explain the 
dialectical relationship between economic growth and labouring class poverty in 
Latin America. As Marini (1973, 71-2) wrote, The sub-continent’s productive 
structure ‘is… based in greater exploitation of the workers’ [than in the economic 
core], and ‘technical progress made possible capitalist intensification of the 
rhythm of the worker’s labour, increasing his productivity and, simultaneously, 
sustaining the tendency to remunerate him at a lower rate than his real value’ 
(Marini, 1973: 71–72). 
John Smith (2016), following Andy Higginbottom (2009), uses the concept 
of super-exploitation to delineate core dynamics of 21st Century Imperialism, 
arguing that  much of the surplus value extracted from impoverished workers in 
the global south is captured by lead firms. This article concurs with Smith here.  
It disagrees with him, however, over is his claim (following Lenin: 1999) that such 
dynamics of value capture also benefit norther\western workers on aggregate.  
By contrast, it argues, complementing Araghi (2003), that the provision of a mass 
of very cheap wage goods produced under conditions of super-exploitation in the 
global south facilitates intensified wage repression and exploitation (including 
super-exploitation), across the global north (Selwyn: 2017a, b, Hammer et al:, 
2015).9   
As part of his analysis of the dynamics of exploitation in production, Marx 
discusses what happens to surplus value as it is distributed beyond the productive 
sphere: 
 
The capitalist who produces surplus-value — i.e., who extracts unpaid 
labour directly from the labourers, and fixes it in commodities, is, indeed, 
                                                          
9 Smith also tends to see northern capital as benefitting primarily from super-exploitation of ‘southern’ 
workers, while underplaying ways in which it accelerates local capital accumulation, industrialisation and 
power augmentation across parts of the global south. 
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the first appropriator, but by no means the ultimate owner, of this surplus-
value. He has to share it with capitalists… who fulfil other functions in the 
complex of social production. Surplus-value… splits up into various parts… 
and take on various mutually independent forms, such as profit, interest, 
gains made through trade, ground rent, etc… (Marx: 1990, 709).  
 
In his discussion of modern landed property, Marx notes that: 
 
Wherever natural forces can be monopolised and guarantee a surplus 
profit to the industrial capitalist using them…there the person who by 
virtue of title to a portion of the globe has become the proprietor of these 
natural objects can wrest this surplus profit from functioning capital in the 
form of rent (Marx, 1974, 773, emphasis added).  
 
While the Schumpeterian notion of rent associates all entrepreneurial profits 
with greater competitive capacity based upon superior resources,  Marx’s 
conception of surplus value distribution and rent illustrates, in addition,  how 
some capitalists that do not preside over production are able to ‘wrest’ portions 
of surplus value away from others (and Selwyn: 2014). As Quentin and Campling  
(2018, 44) put it ‘firms using intellectual property ownership of brands are 
performing the ‘class function’ of modern landed property… in the sense that 
they are not creating value but appropriating it in the form of ground rent’.10  
As will be detailed in the following section, the global business revolution 
is characterised by the rise of what Peter Nolan (2003) calls ‘systems integrators’, 
where TNCs have outsourced low cost labour-intensive activities whilst focussing 
                                                          
10 Further research is undoubtedly required to understand dynamics of labour exploitation, and surplus value 
generation in and distribution through other GVC ‘nodes’ or activities, such as in design, branding and logistics 
activities (but see Newsome: 2010, Flecker, Haidinger,and Schönauer: 2013 and Quentin and Campling: 2018). 
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upon strengthening their ‘core competencies’. The latter are costly and complex 
activities upon which other actors in the value chain are dependent, making them 
vulnerable to systems integrators’ value capture strategies.  Such core 
competencies include research and development, product design, and the 
financing and management of new production. 
So far this section has outlined how a critical GVC approach might conceive 
of surplus value production and distribution amongst different capitals. But how 
is the process systematised and reproduced over time and space? Leading 
proponents of the GVC approach, following Williamson (1979),  explain lead firm 
chain ‘governance’ from the perspective of transaction cost economics (TCE) 
(Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon: 2005). Where transaction costs are potentially 
high (caused, for example, by lack of trust, cheating, lack of or highly complex 
information) then corporations will, in one way or another, assimilate or seek to 
organise/coordinate economic activities in order to reduce these costs. Reduced 
transaction costs through chain governance is portrayed as increasing allocative 
efficiency within and between firms and generating win-win outcomes for lead 
and supplier firms (and usually, by implication, for the workers employed within 
them). Remarkably, Gereffi et al., (2005) do not consider lead firm value 
appropriation strategies as determinants of global value chain governance 
practices.   
 An alternative explanation for the global dispersal and functional 
integration of production under lead firms’ auspices can draw on Stephen 
Hymer’s (1976, 25) argument that ‘the motivation for investment [overseas 
are]… the profits that are derived from controlling the foreign enterprise’. Lead 
firm chain governance facilitates their control at a (geographical and legal) 
distance. Such control may reduce transaction costs, but more significantly it 
enhances value-capture opportunities. 
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 How do the above divergent conceptualisations of value formation and 
transfer within GVCs impact on thinking about labour agency? Critical scholarship 
has drawn upon EO Wright (2000) and Beverly Silver’s (2003) analysis of workers’ 
structural and associational power within GVCs (Selwyn: 2012, Brookes: 2013, 
Lund-Thomsen: 2013). Rather than conceiving of development as a trickle-down 
process, whereby improvements in workers’ pay and conditions follow enhanced 
profitability for capital, these studies prioritise workers’ collective action as a 
potential source of such ameliorations. Such scholarship, while not considered 
further in this article, could provide part of an action-orientated political 
economy married to critical GVC analysis.  
For the purposes of this article, then, three aspects of surplus value 
creation, realisation and distribution are pertinent: 1) Employers use workers’ 
labour power to produce commodities embodying use and exchange values, in 
the process generating more value than the initial cost of the labour power – 
surplus value; 2) Surplus value is realised once products have been sold; and 3) 
Control over dispersed production, procurement, marketing and sale activities 
represents a source of power for firms that do not preside directly over 
production, to capture value in the forms of rents, from those that do (portrayed 
in the misery curve in figure 1). The next section explores further some of these 
dynamics.  
 
4 THE GLOBAL BUSINESS REVOLUTION, PRODUCTIVITY AND WAGE RATE 
DETERMINATION 
The formation of lead-firm governed global value chains is, in part, the outcome 
of attempts by core economy firms, supported by states and international 
institutions, to escape the world economic profit crisis of the 1970s. Having 
escaped this crisis, globalised production became an increasingly important 
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element of northern firms’ competitive strategy. As Charles Whalen (2005, 35) 
noted over a decade ago, ‘[t]he prime motivation behind offshoring is the desire 
to reduce labour costs … a U.S.-based factory worker hired for $21 an hour can 
be replaced by a Chinese factory worker who is paid 64 cents an hour.’   
 The global trade structure is increasingly intra-firm, between affiliates of 
the same corporation located in different countries. Around one-third of world 
trade is intra-firm (Lanz and Miroudot 2011). The percentage of world trade that 
occurs between nominally independent supplier firms and lead firms is often 
higher: ‘90 per cent of US exports and imports flow through a US TNC, with 
roughly 50 per cent of US trade flows occurring between affiliates of the same 
TNC’ (Dicken 2011: 20–1).  
 TNCs derive an increasing share of their profits from overseas activities. 
Foreign affiliates accounted for approximately 17 per cent of US TNCs’ worldwide 
net income in 1977, 27 per cent in 1994 and 48.6 per cent by 2006 (Slaughter 
2009: 16). Rates of return on foreign investment have been ‘consistently higher 
in developing countries (5.8%) than in developed (4.4%)…  countries (3.9%) since 
the beginning of the 1990s’ (UNCTAD 2003:17). US TNCs occupy the pinnacle 
(and, through chain governance, actively contribute to the management) of the 
global wealth–poverty hierarchy (Starrs: 2014). 
Lead firms govern global supply chains by establishing and imposing a 
range of requirements upon supplier firms – including product specifications, 
production conditions, delivery times and, most significantly, prices. Lead firms 
have concentrated increasingly upon their ‘core competencies’ – areas where 
they possess or can establish a competitive advantage vis-à-vis other lead firms 
and/or where they can establish powerful relations over supplier firms. These 
strategies enable lead firms to outsource risks, costs of production and supply 
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and to preside, at a distance, over heightened labour exploitation (Robinson and 
Rainbird: 2013).  
TNCs began pursuing the global business revolution in the 1980s and 1990s 
through increasing spending on research and development, branding, IT and 
related services and through a ‘merger frenzy’ (Nolan 2003: 302–3). In the mid-
2000s the world’s top 1,400 (the G1,400) firms invested US$445 billion in 
research and development. The top 100 firms ‘account for 60 per cent of the total 
R&D spending of the G1,400, while the bottom 100 firms account for less than 1 
per cent of the total’ (Nolan 2014: 750). A consequence of lead firms’ 
concentration on core competencies has been a ‘cascade effect’ across industrial 
sectors, generating intense pressure upon first- and then second-tier suppliers to 
merge, acquire and themselves follow TNCs’ strategies: 
 
Large capitalist firms now stand at the centre of a vast network of 
outsourced businesses which are highly dependent on the core systems 
integrators for their survival. The systems integrators possess the 
technology and/or brand name which indirectly provides sales to the 
supplier firms. They are therefore able to ensure that [they] obtain the 
lion’s share of the profits from the transactions between the two sets of 
firms. (Nolan 2003: 317–18). 
 
A stark case of these forces is the way Apple’s profit for the iPhone in 2010 
constituted over 58 per cent of its final sale price, while Chinese workers’ share 
was 1.8 per cent (figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Distribution of value for the iPhone, 2010 
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Source: Kraemer et al. (2011: 5). 
 
A partial consequence of the centralisation of TNCs’ economic power is that 
‘“monopsonistic” buyer[s] [can] … push down the prices of supplies to marginal 
cost and thus extract the full profits from the sales of the final goods from a 
smaller capital stake’ (Strange and Newton 2006: 184). William Milberg calls this 
the ‘mark-up effect … [through] which the lead firm in the global value chain is 
able to raise the mark-up over costs, not in the traditional oligopoly fashion of 
raising product prices, but through the control of input costs’ (Milberg 2008: 
429). For example, significant import price declines (of over 40 per cent between 
1986 and 2006) have benefited US firms engaged in computers, electrical and 
telecommunications products, clothing, footwear, textiles, furniture, chemicals 
and miscellaneous manufacturers (including toys) (ibid, 433). The ability of TNCs 
to appropriate the lion’s share of value generated within GVCs is reliant, in part, 
upon the political-economic (re)production of very cheap labour by local states 
and capitalist classes. 
 
Wages and Productivity in Global Value Chains 
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Problem-solving GVC approaches associates workers’ low wages with their 
employment in low-productivity economies (e.g., Taglioni and Winkler 2014).11 
For example, Economists in the Employment Trends Unit of the International 
Labour Office contend that ‘poverty should be less associated with employment 
in a higher-productivity economy’, and that, ‘As higher levels of productivity 
facilitate higher average earnings from labour, there is a direct link between 
labour market outcomes – in terms of both the quantity of available jobs and the 
productivity of the workforce – and the middle class standard of living enjoyed 
by the majority of people in the developed world’ (Kapsos and Bourmpoula 2013: 
12, 1, emphasis added).   
 Arguments that low wages in poor countries reflect low productivity levels 
are problematic. First, they often fail to differentiate between national average 
productivity and the productivity of firms integrated into dynamic global value 
chains. It is likely that national average productivity in poor countries will be lower 
than that in rich countries because of the former’s relatively large subsistence 
agriculture and small-scale, mostly low-tech industrial sectors. However, the 
opposite is often the case in larger high-tech export-orientated firms. In such 
workplaces, lead firms require suppliers to adopt advanced technologies to meet 
world market quality requirements at low cost. Here, worker productivity may be 
comparable to if not higher than that in similar firms in rich countries, while their 
pay may be ten, twenty or thirty times less than that of workers in rich countries 
(Ness: 2015, 10-13).  
 Second, the productivity–wage relation is determined primarily, not by 
firm-level productivity, but by labour’s social reproduction costs and by the 
                                                          
11 For example, an OECD\WTO\World Bank publication argues that ‘Global value chains reflect 21st century 
production and provide potential mechanisms for countries… to improve income, employment, and 
productivity’. Further,  ‘…GVCs enable countries to specialise in areas of comparative advantage, thus 
enhancing productivity growth and supporting wages and income’ (2014, 10).  
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balance of power between capital and labour. Where social reproduction costs 
are low, and where states have instituted a capital–labour relation where workers 
are dependent on excessive overtime and/or other sources of wage and non-
wage supplements to sustain themselves, then regardless of productivity, firms 
will find it relatively easy to pay workers poverty wages. Third, it is wrong to 
assume that workers are rewarded according to the value they produce. Rather, 
capitalists seek continually to maximise profit by extracting as much surplus value 
as possible from workers. Whether or not workers receive a greater or lesser 
share of the value they produce is dependent upon the balance of power 
between capital and labour, often instituted by states.  
  The above arguments are supported by a range of data. In the 1990s, for 
example, Doug Henwood (1995: 33) showed how US firms in the Mexican 
maquila sector were 85 per cent as productive as their US-based counterparts, 
but paid their workers only 6 per cent of the wages of the US-based workers 
undertaking comparable tasks. Tony Norfield (2011) writes about Foxconn that 
its ‘level of technology is not so different from that which would be available in 
the home country, but the conditions of labour exploitation are… far more 
extreme than in the home country.’ Robert Wade (2008: 380) notes that, for 
undertaking essentially the same work, ‘the best-paid bus drivers in the world get 
thirty times the real wages of the worst-paid.’ And, in her study of US TNCs’ 
overseas investment strategies Mona Ali (2016, 1014) concludes that ‘[t]he rising 
insecurity of workers…is reflected in across-the-board increases in labour 
productivity…alongside declining wage shares’. 
 Productivity can be measured by dividing the output of a productive 
process by its input. Table 2 provides slightly dated calculations of productivity in 
autos and textiles in the early 2000s by value (dividing worker value added by 
their wages). It shows that Mexico and India have higher productivity rates than 
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the US and Germany in autos, and that Brazil, Thailand and Mexico have higher 
productivity rates than the US and Germany in textiles (Kerswell 2013). The 
implications are that barriers to enhancing workers’ wages and conditions are not 
low productivity but (supplier and lead) firm profit-maximisation strategies.  
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Table 2  Country productivity ranking (automobiles and textiles) 
Country Year Value added per 
worker (annual 
US$) 
Wages per 
worker (annual 
US$) 
Average 
Productivity 
(Worker Value 
Added\Wages 
per worker) 
Automobiles 
Mexico 2000 102,000 11,700 8.69 
India 2003   22,817   4,575 4.99 
US 2002 231,729 54,157 4.28 
Thailand 2000   13,555   4,680 2.85 
Germany 2003   89,117 56,425 1.58 
Textiles 
Brazil 2004   12,353   3,584 3.45 
Thailand 2000     6,583   2,318 2.84 
Mexico 2000   14,983   5,292 2.83 
US 2002   66,483 27,223 2.44 
Germany 2003   43,881 30,974 1.42 
Source: UNIDO (2006), adapted from Kerswell (2013: 513).  
 
Global wage differential reflect less in-firm productivity levels than (at least a 
combination of) 1) the socially determined costs of wage-labour force 
reproduction, 2) labour market institutions (that do or do not seek to link wage 
rates to productivity) and 3) the ability of labouring-class organisations to achieve 
‘progressive’ wage settlements (Moseley 2008). Where the first variable is very 
low, the second pro-capital and anti-labour, and the third weak, and where firms 
utilise relatively advanced technologies, they can benefit from higher 
productivity levels than those in core economies whilst paying poverty wages, 
facilitating increasing surplus value extraction and appropriation (and Ali: 2016).  
 
5 GLOBAL POVERTY CHAINS:  CASE STUDIES 
This section provides empirical examples of super-exploitative working and living 
conditions and wages in highly globalised sectors integrated into buyer-driven 
value chains, focussing on Cambodian garments and Chinese electronics 
respectively. It shows that workers in these sectors are 1) highly productive 2) 
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receive base wages that are insufficient to meet their individual reproduction 
needs (let alone their dependents’) social reproduction requirements 3) are 
required by firms (often by force) and by economic necessity (as a consequence 
of insufficient base wages) to undertake large amounts of overtime, and as a 
consequence of 1-3, they are 4) physically and emotionally degraded.  
Workers in Chinese electronics sectors appear able to meet their own 
physical reproduction costs, but only through excessive overtime with 
deleterious consequences for their health. In the Cambodian case, even with 
overtime, many workers are unable to meet their individual physical reproductive 
requirements.  These cases suggest that when judged against the living wage 
criteria outlined in section 2 above, rather than representing ‘the first rung on 
the ladder out of extreme poverty’, employment in these industries generates 
new forms of worker poverty.  
   
Cambodian Garments 
Following the end of the Cold War, and under the leadership of the Cambodian 
People’s Party, economic development in Cambodia was predicated upon 
attracting Foreign Direct Investment to stimulate export led growth, based upon 
cheap labour. The garment industry expanded, from next to nothing in 1994, to 
around 320 registered (and countless unregistered) factories by 2012 
(Salmivaara: 2018, BFC: 2016, Arnold: 2013), with employment in the sector 
reaching over half a million by 2015 (Human Rights Watch: 2015, 1).  Around 90% 
of workers  are rural-urban migrant women  (Arnold: 2013, 4). The sector is 
predominately owned by Asian capital. Chinese capital has the largest presence 
(around 33%), followed by investors from Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea, 
whilst Cambodian ownership is around 3% (BFC: 2016,).  
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 The 1997 labour law guarantees a minimum wage designed to ensure 
workers enjoy a decent standard of living. It defines overtime as work in excess 
of the normal 8 hour working day, limits it to 12 hours a week, and states that 
such practices can only be deployed ‘exceptionally’ (Asian Floor Wage: 2012, 51, 
65, Salmivaara: 2018, 334 ). These stipulations are not a reality for most workers 
in the garment sector.  
 Overtime, which is often compulsory (i.e. forced), characterises the sector. 
A 2013 survey by Better Factories Cambodia found 94% of factories deploying 
overtime as a regular rather than ‘exceptional’ strategy, and 74% requiring 
workers to undertake more than 2 hours overtime per day\12 hours per week.12  
Many workers in large Cambodian textile factories work between three and five 
hours overtime a day (Human Rights Watch 2015: 58). 
 Historically, workers’ wages have been low, and prone to downward 
pressures.  They declined by 22% between 2001 and 2011 (Workers Rights 
Consortium: 2013). However, between 2014 and 2016, as a consequence of a 
rising tide of workers’ militancy, the minimum wage in the garment sector 
increased from $US 100 to 140 a month. 13   Rather than signifying an 
unambiguous improvement for workers, however, these wage increases have 
been met by employers with work intensification and the cutting of non-wage 
benefits.  
There are two principal employment categories in the sector: 
undetermined duration contracts (UCDs) and fixed-duration contracts (FDCs) 
(Economic Institute of Cambodia: 2008).  Up until the mid 2000s, the majority of 
workers in registered garment factories were employed under UCDs – with 
                                                          
12 https://betterwork.org/cambodia/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Synthesis-Report-29th-EN-Final.pdf 
[accessed July 2018).  
13 http://www.oit.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_631686.pdf 
[accessed July 2018).  
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entitlements to benefits such as sick and maternity leave, paid holidays and 
regular, albeit very low, wages. Since then, across the sector, fixed duration 
contracts have been cut from six to three months, and have become increasingly 
widely deployed, with workers consequently losing many non-wage benefits  
(Arnold: 2013, 11, Kang et al: 2009).  
Wage increases have also been offset by employers through reduced 
overtime payments, from double-time to only 30% above the normal working 
time wage rate (Human Rights Now: 2015, 3). Whilst productivity targets have 
always been high, they have been intensified further since the wage increases of 
2014-206 (ILO: 2017). There are reports of factories reducing the size of work 
teams whilst requiring workers meet the same daily task targets. 14   In one 
example, workers produce 1,200 ‘difficult design’ and 2,000 ‘simple design’ 
garments in an eleven-hour shift (Human Rights Watch: 2015).  
 Workers labour under poor conditions, ranging from lack of health and 
safety provision to overly hot working conditions. One consequence of these 
pressures are high numbers of workplace faintings, reaching approximately 1,806 
in 2015 across the garment and footwear industry (Human Rights Now: 2018).15 
These mass faintings have been explained as a consequence of insufficient calorie 
intake caused by inadequate pay and excessive overtime (Barria: 2014).  
 Table 3 illustrates the discrepancy between workers’ calorie requirements 
and their actual consumption. It is based upon the assumption that in order to 
lead a healthy life workers conducting physically demanding labour over 
extended durations and under tough conditions (such as very hot working 
environments) require 3,000 calories a day. 
 
                                                          
14 http://www.dw.com/en/cambodian-garment-workers-stay-poor-while-dressing-the-west/a-37796952 
15 http://hrn.or.jp/eng/news/2018/03/06/cambodia-mass-faintings/ 
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Table 3: Monthly worker food intake, compared to recommended 3000 calorie food basket 
(2012/2013).  
 Current 
Monthly 
Quantity 
(Kg) 
Calorie 
Value 
(Kcal) 
Cost 
(Riel) 
Cost 
(US$) 
Needed 
for 
Healthy 
Diet (Kg) 
Calorie 
Value 
(Kcal) 
Cost 
(Riel) 
Cost 
(US$) 
 
 
Cereals & 
Carbohydrates 
(including rice 
and noodles) 
7.8 22355 19000 4.75 13.8 49567 35250 8.81 
Meat 2.8 4210 46000 11.50 4.5 68880 78000 19.50 
Fish 3.1 3822 25000 6.25 5.8 7485 44250 11.06 
Eggs 1.2 1116 7400 1.85 3.1 2838 19200 4.80 
Milk 0.5 335 1250 0.31 0.6 402 1500 0.38 
Beans and 
Pulses 
0.9 892 4800 1.20 2.0 1845 11000 2.75 
Vegetables 4.6 2880 26500 6.63 7.9 4147 46000 11.50 
Fruit 2.2 1148 7950 1.99 4.0 2157 15000 3.75 
Oil 0.5 4500 4000 1.00 0.7 6300 5600 1.40 
Sugar 1.0 3980 4200 1.05 2.0 5970 6300 1.58 
Drinks - 2700 37500 9.38 - 2700 37500 9.38 
Spices 0.5 - 500 0.13 0.5 neg 500 0.13 
Totals  47938 184100 46.03  90291 300100 75.03 
Source: Labour behind the Label (2013).  
 
 According to the World Health Organisation a body mass index of less than 
18.5 is underweight, and may indicate eating disorder and\or malnutrition.16 A 
survey of 95 garment workers in the Phnom Penh region in late 2012 and early 
2013 found that 33% of participants had a BMI of between 16.00 and 18.49 
(‘underweight’), and 3% had a BMI of under 16.00 (‘severely underweight’) 
(Labour Behind the Label: 2013, 11). This is not to say that garment workers’ 
conditions are worse than elsewhere in the economy. It does say that 
employment in the sector exposes workers to significant health risks and dangers.  
 As a consequence of their very low pay, rent is relatively high while living 
conditions are poor: 
 
                                                          
16 See http://apps.who.int/bmi/index.jsp?introPage=intro_3.html 
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A cleated gangplank runs from the alleyway up to the raised dilapidated 
shelter that houses all 11 members of the immediate family. A covered 
area, opened on one side to the outside, provides a gathering space for 
cooking and washing. Behind, two adjoining rooms sleep eight in one room, 
three in the other. There is power, as the hysteria of wires running through 
one room attests. There is no running water. A damp thickness of refuse 
carpets the ground below, nuzzled at the moment by an enormous 
rat….Neang pays a monthly rent of $30 (U.S.) for the shanty. The monthly 
utilities total 75,000 riels, or about $18 (Cambodian Centre for Human 
Rights: 2014, 15-16).17 
  
These conditions have generated numerous strikes and protests by workers 
which, whilst pushing up wages, have been met with employer strategies to 
intensify work and cut non-wage costs and brutal state responses. For example, 
in response to mass demonstrations by workers demanding higher wages in 
December 2013, and following from its cheap-labour development strategy, the 
Cambodian state attacked the demonstrations, killing six and wounding many 
others  (Human Rights Watch 2015: 40).  
  
 
Electronics in China 
High-tech electronics such as laptops, iPhones and iPads, represent icons of 
contemporary global capitalism, as their globally dispersed production and sale 
integrates workers, firms and consumers across the world, with China 
representing the world’s electronics assembly platform. In 2008, the foreign 
                                                          
17https://cchrcambodia.org/admin/media/analysis/analysis/english/CCHR_Policy%20Brief%20on%20Garment
%20Industry_(January%202014)_eng.pdf  
30 
 
invested sector accounted for 15-20% of national output, just under 60% of all 
exports and 90% of ‘high-tech’ exports (Kroeber: 2008, 33). 
Giant firms like Pegatron and Foxconn supply Apple and other lead firms. 
Taiwanese-owned Foxconn is China’s largest exporter of high tech electronics 
consumer products, employs over one million workers across China, and rose to 
infamy in 2010 after a spate of worker suicides at its factories (SACOM: 2010). 
 Underpinning China’s role as the world’s electronics assembly platform is 
the largest migration in global history - around 270 million people have left the 
countryside for the towns between 1980 and the presents (Li, Ren and Freidman:  
2016: 1Xix; Pringle: 2011). Under the now relaxed (hukou) household registration 
system rural residents move to work in towns and cities, but they are not entitled 
to any of the state and local government subsidised benefits  for urban residents, 
and are generally expected to return to their home villages when they get old or 
lose their jobs (as with the massive, but temporary ,home-bound waves of some 
20 million rural migrants following the 2008 economic downturn and layoffs)  
(Pun and Koo: 2015, KW Chan: 2010).   This ‘floating population’ comprises up to 
70 per cent of workers in the manufacturing sector (Friedman 2014; Foster and 
McChesney 2012). In Foxconn’s Pearl River Delta plants, for example, between 
75% and 80% of workers were rural-urban migrants (Lüthje and Butollo: 2017, 
225).  
The electronics labour force is increasingly male, as female infanticide (in 
response to China’s one-child policy) has skewed the gender ratio towards males 
(Chan, Pun and Seleden: 2013). Migrants’ wages are a fraction of those of formal 
urban workers, and in partial consequence, ‘neither can they depend on wages 
alone to live a decent life in cities nor can they obtain sufficient subsistence 
resources from their hometown villages’ (Feng: 2017, 608).  
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 Apple stands at the pinnacle of the global electronics sector (see figure 2 
above). It’s value chain management includes direct intervention in supplier 
firms’ labour processes. For example, it requires its ‘suppliers  achieve an average 
of 95 percent compliance with our maximum 60-hour week’ (Apple Inc. 2014). 
This contrasts to the International Labour Organization’s Convention C030 on 
work hours, which recommends upper limits of forty-eight hours per week and 
eight hours per day respectively (Fuchs: 2016).  
While workers’ base wages in the sector are insufficient for their individual 
reproduction requirements, they do appear able to attain these through vast 
amounts of overtime. In the process, however, they are also subject to various 
types of forced labour, and dangerous and health-damaging working conditions 
(China Labour Watch: 2014, 2015a, b, c, 2016a, 2017). The documentary film 
Complicit highlights the proliferation of occupational Leukemia in China’s 
electronics industry.18  
 Indicative research provides estimates about the discrepancy between 
monthly minimum wages and workers’ social reproduction requirements  in two 
cities in the Guangdong provide (table 4).  
 
  
                                                          
18 http://complicitfilm.org/ 
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Table 4: Monthly Minimum Wage and Social Wage in Guangdong Province, China: April 2017 
 Minimum Wage (Yuan and 
US$) 
Social Wage (Yuan and US$ 
Guangzhou 1,895 Yuan\$295 3,755 Yuan\$584 
Dongguan 1,510 Yuan\$235 3,439 Yuan\$534 
Source: Good Electronics\Worker Empowerment https://goodelectronics.org/workers-wage-
living-expenses-report-covering-four-tier-cities-guangdong-province-china/ 
Note: These calculations are based on the assumption of two working adults and one 
dependent child. Hence they are more conservative than the CCC\AFW conception of a living 
wage in section 2.  
 
Over the last decade the Chinese state and local municipalities have raised 
minimum wages, in part as a response to growing labour unrest and labour 
shortages, and to expand the domestic market (Hung: 2015). Electronics 
manufacturers have responded to these, and other wage-inflating pressures, by 
further intensifying the labour process. Pun and Chan (2012, 400)  quote a group 
of young workers responsible for processing cell phone casings in the Foxconn 
Shenzhen factory saying that “Production output was set at 5,120 pieces per day 
in the past, but it has been raised by 20 percent to 6,400 pieces per day in recent 
months.”  At Pegatron Shanghai workers must assemble 450-500 motherboards 
per hour. Over half of its employees worked over ninety hours overtime a month 
because ‘their base wages … cannot meet the local living standard’ (China Labor 
Watch 2015 a, 2). In the Donngguan Chenming Electronic Company, which 
assembles PC shells and cases, task targets are 2,000 products per day (China 
Labour Watch: 2016, 14).    
In addition to labour process intensification some manufacturers are 
reducing workers’ overall compensation. Following the government of Shanghai’s 
increase of the minimum wage from $304 to $330 in April 2015 Pegatron 
followed suit. However, to offset the increase, it cut worker subsidies, increased 
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workers’ employment costs by making them liable for workplace insurance, and 
implemented other changes to the remuneration structure.  Workers that 
worked 40 regular hours per week plus 40 weekend overtime hours per month 
were US$24.5 worse off, whilst without overtime they were US$60.9 worse off 
than prior to the increase of the minimum wage (table 5).  
 
Table 5: Pegatron workers Income Before and After the 2015 Minimum Wage Increase (In US$) 
 Busy Season (assuming 40 regular 
hours per week and 40 weekend 
overtime hours) 
Offseason (assuming no overtime) 
 Before the wage 
rise 
After Before the wage 
rise 
After 
Base Wage 304.3 349.5 304.3 349.5 
Overtime Pay 244.9 281.2 0.0 0.0 
Food Subsidy 42.2 0.0 42.0 0.0 
Performance 
Bonus 
7.5 0.0 7.5 0.0 
Seniority Pay 42.5 42.5 42.5 42.5 
Skill Allowance 22.6 22.6 22.6 22.6 
Meals -60.3 -60.3 -60.3 -60.3 
Accomodation 
fee 
-24.1 -24.1 -24.1 -24.1 
Insurance 0.0 -56.4 0.0 -56.4 
Total 582.3 557.8 337.5 276.6 
Change after the 
raise 
0.0 -24.5 0.0 -60.9 
Source: China Labour Watch (2016: 12). 
 
   
 Foxxon and Pegatron house workers in their ‘dormitory labour system’ on 
and off factory grounds (Pun and Smith: 2007).  In the former, workers typically 
number up to eight per room.  In the latter, a China Labour Watch investigation 
describes accommodation comprising ‘a four storey building with 43 rooms on 
each floor and 14 beds to a room’ (China Labour Watch: 2015 b, 20). Whilst such 
conditions are often considered degrading (by workers and by investigators), 
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workers tend to favour them over the often unaffordable alternative of private 
sector renting (Pun and Chan: 2012). 
 
 In another attempt to reduce costs, firms are deploying new ways of 
accessing very cheap labour. Up to 9 million interns were working in 
manufacturing and other industries in 2010, many of whom are channelled into 
the electronics sector by their schools.19 Vocational schools benefit financially 
from these arrangements, as they may deduct commissions from interns’ salaries 
or get paid directly by factories. In some cases interns can make up the majority 
of the labour force.20  Interns earn less than regular workers. Examples provided 
by the China Labour Bulletin include salaries as low as one fifth of a regular 
workers’ starting salary and also the payment of ‘living expenses’ instead of 
wages, as low as US$7 a month. Some of these interns are as young as 15 and 
therefore classify as child labour (China Labour Watch: 2015 b, 2016 c).  
 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
The predominant claim within GVC academic and policy communities is that 
workers benefit from employment in global value chains. Many of these claims 
are based upon conceptions of poverty/non-poverty derived from the World 
Bank’s International Poverty Line (currently $1.90 PPP 2015). But this IPL is an 
arbitrary measure. It was not designed, and cannot be used, to assess whether 
individuals can actually survive, still less meet their individual basic needs at such 
a level of consumption. If a poverty measure based upon workers’ individual and 
familial social reproduction requirements is deployed to investigate the 
                                                          
19 http://www.clb.org.hk/sites/default/files/archive/en/share/File/general/vocational_school_system.pdf 
20 https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/oct/06/laptop-firms-accused-of-labour-abuses-
against-chinese-students-sony-hp-acer 
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relationship between employment in GVCs and poverty generation/alleviation, 
then a profoundly different, and often negative, image emerges.   
 The article’s empirical sections show how workers in Cambodia’s garment 
and China’s electronics sectors labour under intense pressure to meet very high 
and rising productivity targets, receive base wages that are insufficient to meet 
their individual reproduction needs let alone their social reproduction 
requirements, undertake large amounts of overtime, and as a consequence of 
these combined pressures, are physically and emotionally degraded. Cambodian 
workers, even when they undertake extensive overtime, often find it difficult to 
earn enough to meet their individual basic calorie requirements. In China 
extensive overtime does appear to enable workers to meet (only) their individual 
reproduction requirements. In neither case, however, even with extensive 
overtime, do workers earn a living wage. The article explains these processes as 
outcomes of super-exploitation.  
 This article shows how core GVC categories - of value-added, rent and 
chain governance – and the claim (or assumption) that workers’ wages are 
determined by in-firm productivity - effectively bias problem-solving GVC 
research towards positive conclusions about the relationship between 
employment within globalised industries and workers’ livelihoods and/or how to 
achieve such beneficial outcomes. The empirical findings of this article suggest, 
rather, the need for a theoretical reformulation of core concepts and categories 
associated with the GVC approach in order to better see and explain dynamics of 
worker exploitation and poverty generation.  To this end it advances the theory 
and methodology of Global Poverty Chain analysis. In pursuing this endeavour, it 
distinguishes between problem-solving and critical variants of GVC analysis. The 
former aims to comprehend and facilitate capitalist development across the 
global south. It views capital-accumulation as the basis of human development 
36 
 
and explains workers’ low wages as arising from low productivity, rather than 
from exploitation and lead firm value capture strategies. Its concept of supplier 
firm upgrading allocates primary development agency to firm managers, and 
legitimates the existence of TNCs and their global expansion. Combined with the 
World Bank’s arbitrarily low international poverty line it portrays employment in 
supplier firm factories as a route out of poverty.  
 This article’s GPC approach uses the concept of super-exploitation to 
highlight and explain how employment in GVCs may be predicated upon poverty 
wages and physical degradation. It deconstructs the developmental 
opportunities offered by TNCs to supplier firm regions of the world economy, 
illuminating how the former govern their supply chains in order to maximise value 
capture. By adopting the Clean Clothes Campaign\Asian Floor Wage conception 
of a living wage as its developmental base line, this article brings to the fore the 
‘moral element’ of workers’ social reproduction costs (i.e. it conceives of workers 
as human beings with multiple needs, and as family members, rather than as 
atomised venders of labour power).  
 This article provides only an introduction to the GPC approach. The 
application of its core concepts and categories – the extraction and distribution 
of surplus value, chain governance as a power-based value-capture strategy, and 
its argument that the relationship between wages and productivity is determined 
primarily by social reproduction costs, all require further investigation and 
refinement. Further critical GVC and\or GPC research might include an 
investigation into the numbers and percentage of value chains in which workers’ 
do (not) receive living wages, the extent to which workers that do not receive 
living wages could do so through a fairer distribution of value across the chains, 
and mechanisms and policies to achieve such outcomes.  Such investigation 
would necessitate improvements in our ability to trace value formation, 
37 
 
movement and capture throughout GVCs/GPCs chains. If it is found that workers 
in the majority of GVCs do not earn a living wage then the very term GVC, and its 
associated conceptual apparatus, will come to be seen as misguided at best. The 
Global Poverty Chain concept aims to illuminate the exploitative architecture of 
capitalist globalisation, and by doing so to facilitate thinking about alternative 
approaches to real human development.  
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